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Laws: Religion and Law

RELIGION AND LAW
THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD JUSTICE JOHN LAWS*
I.

THREE RULES

In this Lecture I am going to talk about the relation between religion and the
legal power of the State; in particular, how religious belief and practice are to be
accommodated within a democracy. At the outset I will state three propositions.
I will call them rules, but they are of my own making. I have found them useful
as a means of expressing, in a more or less rigorous fashion, my view as to how
these matters should be ordered. The first rule is that the State must not demand
that its citizens adhere to any particular religious belief. I will call this the rule
of the agnosticState. The second rule is that the State must not by law require or
prohibit any measure or practice on the ground only that it is espoused by or is
offensive to adherents of any particular religious faith. I will call this the rule of
religious neutrality. The third rule, however, is that the State must stoutly
defend the right of every person to worship as he will, or not at all, and to
express his faith or his atheism as he chooses, subject only to reasonable
objective limitations in the interest of others. I will call this the rule of religious

freedom.
I will say something about each of these propositions or rules before
considering whether and how they may be justified. First, the rule of the
agnostic State-the State must not demand that its citizens adhere to any
particular religious belief. This may seem very obvious to a modem western
audience-on either side of the Atlantic-and one might suppose it to be wellestablished in developed civilised States. Nothing, surely, is more elementary
than freedom of thought. The idea that the State should by law insist on a
citizen's subscription to a particular religious belief is barbarous, not because the
belief is false (it may be true), but because it steals from the citizen his own
mind-if he cannot choose what to believe, he is less than a person. Such
terrible constraints are the stuff of religious extremism, but the State's insistence
on thrusting religious belief down the throats of its citizens has a very lively
history. In the annals of Christianity, it was the inspiration of the Spanish
Inquisition. There are still Christians who relish it. There are some extremist
religious believers of the present day who would claim not only to dictate what
their fellow citizens should think, but would commend measures to make them
think in line. There are Muslims who believe that apostasy should be met with
the death penalty.
We should notice that the rule of the agnostic State applies as surely to
political as to religious beliefs. Political dictatorships have always tried to
dictate what their people believe. It is a poison most graphically illustrated by
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George Orwell's marvellous and terrifying novel, 1984-"Big Brother is
Watching You." It is the stuff of the brainwashing nightmares of the Cold War.
There is no moral or logical difference between defying the rule of the agnostic
State in a religious context and denying it in a political context.
It is a curiosity that there is, as it happens, a provision remaining in the law
of England which forbids free thought-it is the Black Rubric, which is one of
the instructions appended to the Order for Holy Communion in the Book of
Common Prayer. It is in these terms:

Whereas it is ordained in this office for the Administration of the Lord's
Supper, that the Communicants should receive the same kneeling; ...
yet, lest the same kneeling should by any persons, either out of
ignorance and infirmity, or out of malice and obstinacy, be misconstrued
and depraved: It is here declared, that thereby no Adoration is intended,
or ought to be done, either unto the Sacramental Bread or Wine there
bodily received, or unto any Corporal Presence of Christ's natural Flesh
and Blood.
The Rubric was composed by Archbishop Cranmer for his second Prayer Book
of 1552. It requires the communicant to kneel but forbids him to worship the
bread and wine as if it were Christ's flesh and blood. It is intended to regulate
what happens in his head while he is on his knees. Her late Majesty Queen
Elizabeth I had the Rubric removed; as Sir Francis Bacon tells us, "She would
not make windows into men's souls." But it was restored in the Book of
Common Prayer of 1662, one of the "historic formularies" of the Church of
England, and has been the law of the land ever since. But this, of course, is
ecclesiastical law, about which I will have a little more to say.
I turn to the second rule, the rule of religious neutrality-the State must not

by law require or prohibit any measure or practice on the ground only that it is
espoused by or is offensive to adherents of any particular religious faith. The
rule of the agnostic State and the rule of religious neutrality are closely related,
but they are not the same. The first prohibits attempts to control what men think.
The second prohibits attempts to control what men do. The relationship is close
for the obvious reason that what men think often governs what they do. The
issues generated by the rule of religious neutrality are, to coin a phrase,
somewhat less apocalyptic than the issues to which the rule of the agnostic State
gives rise-but they occupy, I think, a more lively place in western society's
daily fabric. The principal difficulty is with the negative part of the rule-the
State must not prohibit any conduct or practice on the ground only that it is
offensive to the adherents of a particular religious faith. Like the rule of the
agnostic State, the force of this imperative is not limited to the religious context.
Offensiveness does not justify State censorship or other prohibitive laws.
Offensiveness is to be condemned, and roundly condemned, at the bar of good
manners, not in the dock of the criminal court.
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The third rule, the rule of religiousfreedom, is that the State must stoutly

defend the right of every person to worship as he will, or not at all, and to
express his faith or his atheism as he chooses, subject to reasonable objective
limitations in the interest of others. This rule may roughly be regarded as the
converse, or perhaps the corollary, of the other rules-the rule of the agnostic
State and the rule of religious neutrality. Whereas those rules condemn
compulsion by the State of thought or conduct on religious grounds, the rule of
religious freedom demands the opposite-freedom of belief and worship. To
suppress freedom of religion is to suppress freedom of expression. In its most
virulent form, it is to suppress freedom of thought, and only brainwashers do
that. Suppressing freedom of thought is the vice of the first rule. As I have said,
it steals from the citizen his own mind-if he cannot choose what to believe, he
is less than a person. In this wonderful country, home of my favourite pastime,
watching old movies, there is a movie analogy-Invasion of the Body Snatchers
(the original 1950s version is much the best).
II.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE RULES

Now let me turn more closely to the justification of these rules. Is there a
single driving principle behind the rule of the agnostic State, the rule of religious
neutrality, and the rule of religious freedom? We are, I think, accustomed to
justify the post-war liberal political consensus by reference to two ideals-to
draw an image from Plato's dialogue the Phaedrus, it is a kind of double-yoked
chariot.' The horses which draw the chariot, the two ideals, are democracy and
the rule of law. Is this-are these-the driving principle? Democracy and the
rule of law have become something of a mantra. But there are problems with
both. Thus, if you try and give an account of why democracy is virtuous, you
run into difficulties. As a system of government, democracy is fully capable of
perpetrating horrific injustices; the price of universal suffrage is that the vote of
the stupid, malicious, and ignorant elector (if he troubles to exercise it) is worth
the same as anyone else's, and there are difficulties in classifying democracy as
an end rather than a means, or vice versa. Then, if you try and give an account
of what the rule of law means, again you run into difficulties. Does the rule of
law require only that the State be governed by laws which are published and on
the whole not retrospective? But in that case, it is pretty thin soup as a
constitutional principle. Or does it further require that the content of the laws
should be good, replete with enlightened human rights? But in that case, the rule
of law is not an autonomous principle at all, but a mere catalogue of the sociopolitical virtues favoured by whoever happens to be thinking about it.
Any proper discussion of democracy and the rule of law needs to confront
these difficulties, and I have attempted elsewhere to do so, however

1. PLATO, PHAEDRUS 28, at *2 4 6a-b (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c.
360 B.C.E.).
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superficially. But this is not my theme today. I am sure we need democratic
government as an engine against tyranny. And I am sure we need the rule of law
as an overarching principle of justice. However, it is a long intellectual road to
get to these conclusions, and I think that, for present purposes, the justification of
the rule of the agnostic State, the rule of religious neutrality, and the rule of
religious freedom is nearer to hand. It rests in two qualities which march with
democracy and the rule of law; indeed, their value largely constitutes the
philosophical foundation of democracy and the rule of law. These qualities are
freedom and reason. The first is an aspiration of humankind. The second is a
characteristic of humankind. A free and reasonable person is responsible for his
own self. He is responsible for what he thinks and for how he behaves. His
right of free thought is absolute. His right of free behaviour, having
consequences outside himself, is restricted, but only by laws imposing
proportionate constraints for the protection of the rights of others and the
security of the State. His beliefs and his morals cannot be dictated to him.
These considerations articulate the essential autonomy of the individual
citizen. And the essential autonomy of the individual citizen is an ideal which
owes much to the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant-every person is to
be treated as an end in himself, not a means.2 The individual citizen is not to be
dictated to on the strength of someone else's opinion, however heartfelt. These
ideas justify and require compliance by the State with the rule of the agnostic
State, the rule of religious neutrality, and the rule of religious freedom-unless,
of course, there is some overriding imperative in the other direction. But there is
not. Considerations of the nature of religious truth and the place of religion in
society tend to support, rather than contradict, the three rules.
In looking at the nature of religious truth and the place of religion in society,
I would offer you two contrasts which I think may illuminate the force of our
three rules. The first contrast is between two different kinds of truth. The
second contrast is between two different kinds of States or polities.
III. Two KINDs OF TRUTH
Here is the first contrast-between two different kinds of truth. I will call
them factual truth and religious truth. Facts and events which happen are one
kind of truth. They are objectively ascertainable and communicable. They may
be proved by evidence. Their consequences may be assessed and judged by
reference to other facts and events, which are likewise susceptible to objective
proof. That is factual truth. Contrast religious truth-if it is a truth. It is
received through faith. It is revealed, not proved; it is neither capable of being
proved, nor disproved. Therefore, it lives only in and through its believers. In a
world of ascertainable facts and events, the world of factual truth, there is-for

2.

See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary

Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785).
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reasons I will briefly set out-a rational place for laws which bind everyone,
with or without their consent. In a world where asserted truth is received (and
only received) through faith, the world of religious truth, there is no such place
for binding law.
IV. TIE LOGIC OF OBEDIENCE

This position is, I think, supported by considerations relating to the logic of
the concept of obedience. The fact that X commands you to do Y cannot of itself
entail that you should do it. This is an instance of what is often called Hume's
Law-you cannot derive an ought from an is. 3 It is true whatever the identity of
X, even if X is God. The proposition that X commands you to do Y is a
proposition of fact-an is. No normative proposition-no ought-can be
deduced from it. The bare existence of a master's command is of itself no basis
whatever to require the servant's obedience. There must always be a higher
premise. The higher premise must consist in an established prior obligation to
obey the orders of X. But X cannot himself provide the premise. It must lie
outside him and is logically prior to him. As I have said, the logic is the same
whether X is God or man. In every case where it is claimed that an order issued
by X ought to be obeyed-unless there is some separate reason for such
obedience (such as an acceptance that it is anyway a good thing to do on its own
merits)-the claim only has force if there is to be found an established prior
obligation to obey the orders of X. In every case, the question must be-what is
the basis of this prior obligation, this higher premise?
My suggestion to you is that in the world of factual there is a higher premise
to support the duty of everyone to obey the general laws of the State, but in the
world of religious truth, there is no such higher premise to support a general or
universal duty to obey the laws of God written in the holy book.
V.

DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW

I would articulate the higher premise giving rise to the duty to obey the law
in the following way. First, it cannot consist in any expression of a desire or a
command on the part of the ruler of the State, the maker of the laws. The ruler
of the State in this instance has the role of X-the person whose commands are
putatively to be obeyed. But as we have seen, X cannot himself provide the
premise. It must lie outside him and is logically prior to him. Nor, plainly, can
the higher premise consist in a desire or a command on the part of anyone else.

3.
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. I, § 1, at 469 (L.A. SelbyBigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1740). Compare 1 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES 57-59 (Princeton Univ. Press, 4th ed. rev. 1963) (1945) (discussing the distinctions
between "natural" laws and "nonnative" laws), with GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA

9-10 (1st ed. report 1951) (1903) (discussing the "naturalistic fallacy" theory).
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It must rest in a principle or principles whose acceptance is demanded by the
force of reason.
Now, the fact that we are rational beings, possessed of free will, and living
in community with others of our kind requires us to come to terms with each
other. It is an inevitable confrontation. At every turn the individual is faced
with choices which affect his fellows, who will judge him and make their own
choices. Such judgments and choices define the culture in which their makers
live. They-we-have to confront the misery of cruelty and selfishness, in
ourselves and in others. Unless we build our culture on such ideals as selfrestraint, honesty, mutual respect, and fair treatment, we have no hope of being
at peace with each other or ourselves. We cannot live in a free society without
these ideals, save at the price of endless insecurity-each person would fear his
stronger neighbour, and the currency of all our dealings would be brutality and
distrust. These ideals are the very condition upon which human community is
tolerable. They take their place as primary moral principles. They are the
touchstones, at least they are among the touchstones, upon which other
principles are honed and sharpened. They are critical to the principles which
govern civic or political society. And as such they require an acceptance of
compulsory law. The citizen must be subject to the general law, which is made
and enforced for the general good. Otherwise, the conditions upon which society
is tolerable, in which humanity can flourish, are writ in water. Here-however it
is precisely expressed-rests the higher premise, the prior obligation, which
gives rise to the duty of obedience to the particular laws which are made by the
State, and which the State is entitled to enforce. I would express it as the need
for constitutional rule, the need for an ordered State. And the context for all this
is the first kind of truth: factual truth-the truth of ascertainable facts and events.
I should acknowledge, though it is obvious, that this coarse summary of the
rationale of the duty to obey the law does no justice to the reams of philosophical
learning that bear upon the subject. It may be said to start with Plato's dialogue
the Crito, set in 399 B.C.E. Socrates had been convicted of impiety and was
condemned to death. But his execution was delayed by a month out of respect
for a religious festival during which executions were forbidden. During this
time, he was visited in jail by his friend Crito, who tried to persuade him to
escape-which was a real enough possibility. Socrates refused. His reasons,
given in the dialogue, are contained in a long exposition about the force of a
solemn contract between himself and the State. And, of course, the notion of a
social contract has resonated through the writings of Hobbes,4 Locke,s
Rousseau, 6 and Rawls. 7 It is obvious that such a contract is fictional, since not

4.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., MacMillan 1947) (1651).

5.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1967) (1690).
6.
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Willmoore Kendall trans., Henry

Regnery 1954) (1762)
7.

JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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every citizen agrees to obey the law. The fiction is developed, however, to show
that rational people would consent to political rule if they were confronted with
the alternative-anarchy and the brutish power of the strongest. But this Lecture
is not the place to enlarge upon the theory of the social contract, even if I were
up to the task.
VI. RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE
I have suggested that while there is a higher premise to support the duty of
everyone to obey the general laws of the State, there is no such higher premise to
support a general or universal duty to obey the laws of God written in the holy
book. There is no analogue to the need for an ordered State, and the need for an
ordered State cannot serve as the higher premise for a duty to obey the laws of
God. An ordered State (based on the ideals I have described), self-restraint, and
the rest may be fulfilled without any reference to God whatever or any religious
position being taken. Loving-kindness, the greatest of all the virtues, is by no
means the monopoly of the religious. This is a position which can cause
discomfort to the devout, because it seems to claim that their God is an
irrelevancy to the great issues about what makes a healthy polity. But I do not
think it is as stark as that. Let it be supposed that man is created in God's image,
so that his freedom, his reason, and his social nature are God-given. In that case,
God is to thank for the state of affairs that is humankind; the existence of that
state of affairs has been brought about by Him. But the truth or falsity of this
proposition does not itself touch what is implied by the need for an ordered
State. Nor does it provide a higher premise to justify a general or universal duty
of obedience to God's commands.
For many believers, however, there is such a higher premise. It is, simply,
that God's commands are always to be obeyed. Both the premise, and the
commands, are to be found in holy writ. But you will see at once that the God
who is said to command obedience is here claimed also to be the source of the
higher premise. That cannot be-a general duty to obey X must, as I have said,
be founded on a higher premise which is logically prior to X, even if X is God.
The proposition that God's commands are always to be obeyed cannot be
justified by stating that the proposition is simply another of God's commands.
Accordingly, such a duty to obey cannot be objectively demonstrated to the
people generally as something they have to accept, like it or not. It lives only in
the faith of those who choose to accept it.
I will say a little more about scripture, the holy book, since for many
believers this is the critical source of religious truth. As I have stated, the
existence of God and His nature are claimed to be revealed to us in the
scriptures, and so are God's commands as to how we should and should not
behave. Now, the nature of scriptural authority is a very large subject, which has
exercised the minds of scholars over the centuries and is the subject of much
distinguished academic writing. My submission to you-I have already
foreshadowed it-is that nothing in the holy books of any religion can of itself
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justify the imposition of general compulsory law in the civil State. No claim of
scriptural authority can contradict the proposition that religious truth, if truth it
is, is received through faith; it is revealed, not proved-it is neither capable of
being proved nor disproved. Therefore, it lives only in and through its believers.
Its acceptance is necessarily voluntary. In this it is in contrast to the first kind of
truth, factual truth. The holy book's demand for obedience cannot create a
general duty to obey which ought to be enforced by the law.
That is not the end of it. Legal obligation cannot be given by the words of
the holy book, uncritically accepted. But nor can moral truth be so given. To
suggest that morality without more is given in a book of rules prescribed by
scripture is to degrade morality. It reduces the virtue of a good conscience to the
drudgery of mere obedience, and it provides no principled basis even for the
drudgery of obedience. If the duty of obedience is to be found simply in the
book's literal pages, then it is blind and unreasoned. If it is said that the divine
command is accompanied by promises of bliss or threats of torment, why then
the due responses of the slavish faithful are merely self-centred. The carrot and
the stick are the same creatures, however big they are. They certainly have
nothing to do with duty or principle. And they have nothing to do with
goodness.

Accordingly, scripture should not be treated, without more, either as
compulsory law or as compulsory morals. Its adherents may of course obey its
precepts; not because they must, but because they choose. However, none of
these considerations-and I would emphasise this-needs diminish the force of
scripture. The holy book may be inspirational; its words may rightly be
treasured, as are those of the King James Bible, whose 400th anniversary falls
next year. It may work a benign and mysterious alchemy in the souls of those
who treasure it. Its value may grow-its wisdom seen to be more and more
secure-as through the ages generation succeeds generation. The principles it
offers may commend themselves, not only by virtue of the stamp of divinity, but
because they are seen to be good in the world of facts and events. In that case, it
will invite obedience and rational society will respond. But the holy book has of
itself no claim to command obedience that is not freely given.
Let me add these observations. It is not a coincidence that no higher premise
can be found to substantiate a duty to obey the commands of God, at least if the
God we are discussing is an all-powerful creator. It is a necessary truth-the
assertion of such a higher premise is self-contradictory. As we have seen, such a
premise must lie outside X, who gives the orders that are putatively to be obeyed.
It is logically prior to X. But there is, surely, nothing beyond an all-powerful
creator-nothing that is logically prior to him. Accordingly, the existence of
such a creator and the existence of a higher premise, which justifies or requires a
duty of obedience to his commands, are mutually inconsistent propositions.
It follows that if we are to speak coherently of a duty to obey God's
commands, we must mean something different from a duty of obedience in the
factual world. It cannot be an enforceable duty, given by a higher premise, of
the kind which justifies compulsory law. It can only be a voluntary duty,
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willingly undertaken by the duty-ower. This distinction between a compulsory
duty to obey the laws of the State and a voluntary duty to obey the laws of God
is of the first importance. If they are confused and religious precepts are
advanced as the basis of compulsory law in the civil State, that would be to
impose the unprovable beliefs of some upon everyone. It would be a form of
political tyranny-more accurately, a theocratic tyranny.
Theocracy is
necessarily tyrannous because it involves the exaction of compulsory obedience
with no objective justification.
No such arrangement would be assented to by the people generally, unless of
course they (or a majority of them) subscribed of their own volition to the
proposition that God's commands are always to be obeyed and are to be found in
holy writ. That brings me to the second of the two contrasts I proposed to
canvass with you.
VII. Two KINDs OF POLITY

The first contrast was between factual truth and religious truth. The second
is between two kinds of States or polities. In the first, the overwhelming
majority of citizens assume the truth of a monotheistic religion whose God is allpowerful, takes a close interest in human affairs, and is liable to visit his
approval or disapproval on the people according to their compliance or otherwise
with his will. Contrast the second kind of State-where no single religion
prevails. There is a kaleidoscope of religious opinion ranging from a devout
belief in the all-powerful God of the first State to outright atheism, with many
different "theisms" in between, including an easygoing kind of scepticism or
agnosticism. These two model States tend to put our three rules in their proper
respective contexts.
In the first kind of State, the government, whether democratic or autocratic,
will if it is rational make laws and elaborate policies which will appease the God.
He is a jealous God-Thou shalt have no other Gods but me-and he does not
approve of religious toleration or freedom to worship gods other than himself.
The people are in fear of him, and the State is in fear of him on their behalf.
There is little or no appetite for any of our three rules, since an unquestioning
belief in this jealous God is all but universal. There is certainly no appetite for
the rule of religious neutrality because the State and the people believe that their
God will only be appeased by measures and practices favoured by him-forms
of religious observance, prohibition of certain sexual practices, restrictions or
requirements of forms of dress, and so forth. If it is sufficiently convinced of the
terrible consequences of doing otherwise, the State will pass all these strictures
into law.
In the second kind of State-where there is a kaleidoscope of religious
opinion and belief, together with atheism, skepticism, and agnosticism-there
are, or should be, no such adamantine constraints. There is no will to impose
them. The State is free to sign up to all three rules, which are-for reasons I
have already given-commended by the precepts of freedom and reason.
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CONCLUSIONS

We live in the second kind of State. We used to live in the first. The
challenge offered by my subject in this Lecture is the insight that our three rules
were repugnant to the first kind of State, but are rational and necessary in the
second. Much of the difficulty resides in the fact that the cultural and historical
shift from the first State to the second has been gradual; perhaps it is still
incomplete. In England we can see the beginnings of the move away from a
blind adherence to the literal word of scripture in the work of Richard Hooker,
appointed Master of the Temple in 1585 and perhaps the greatest of English
theologians.8 He brought to its flourishing a religious philosophy consisting in a
threefold appeal to scripture, tradition, and reason. Hooker's thought was
prefigured by John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury from 1559, whose Apology for the
Church of England was published in 1562. Hooker's great work, The Laws of

Ecclesiastical Polity, is "a carefully worked answer to seven Puritan
propositions." 9 Of these, a foremost Puritan principle was that scripture alone is
the "rule of all things which in this life may be done by men."10 But this is the
jackboot of the single book, the cold command. Hooker's appeal to tradition and
reason alongside scripture begins a journey down a road where far greater
rewards are to be found. His view of the Bible was, of course, a sixteenthcentury view; he affirmed "the absolute perfection of scripture," but this was by
no means the same as the Puritan principle. For Hooker, reason was a vital
guide to the understanding and the use of scripture: "For whatsoever we believe
concerning salvation by Christ, although the scripture be therein the ground of
our beliefe; yet the authoritie of man is, if we marke it, the key which openeth
the dore of entrance into the knowledge of the scripture."12 As Henry McAdoo
says:
To sum it up: Hooker gives the primacy of value to Scripture and to
reason in his hermeneutics and a secondary value to tradition which also
has authority but only in so far as it is consonant with Scripture and with
reason. In other words, Scriptural interpretation involves maintaining a
balance between reason and grace, "the special grace of the Holy Ghost"
concurring "to the enlightening of our minds"; a balance between

8.
Here I am indebted to Henry McAdoo's essay on Richard Hooker. See Henry McAdoo,
Richard Hooker, in THE ENGLISH RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND THE GENIUS OF ANGLICANISM 105,
105-23 (Geoffrey Rowell ed., 1992).
9.
Id. at 111.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWES OF ECCLESIASTICALL POLITIE bk. II, at 123 (Da Capo
Press 1971) (1594).
12. Id. at 116.
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private and personal conclusions on the one hand and the corporate
wisdom of the Church on the other. 13
A hundred years or so after Hooker, there were the beginnings of the
Enlightenment, which most clearly started to push open the door to our three
rules-the rule of the agnostic State, the rule of religious neutrality, and the rule
of religious freedom. Now in the twenty-first century we have-we certainly
ought to have-reached the point where these are well in place. But the truth is
that they rattle around in a box they do not entirely fit. By and large, as I have
said, we do indeed live in the second kind of State-the pluralist State. Here and
in the United Kingdom, in the nations of the European Union, and in other
advanced societies, the State imposes no requirement of religious belief; and, by
and large, it offers fair guarantees of freedom of religious thought and
expression. So the first and third rules are reasonably well-established.
However, we still have difficulties with the second rule, the rule of religious
neutrality. Remember the terms in which I introduced it to you-the State must
not by law require or prohibit any measure or practice on the ground only that it
is espoused by or is offensive to adherents of any particular religious faith. Yet,
in modem developed States there are laws forbidding certain kinds of dress on
religious grounds. The display of some religious symbols is suppressed, or
sought to be suppressed, on grounds that it may offend members of other
religious faiths. There are calls for discrimination against homosexuals. We
have still not got it entirely clear that the law of the State has to be founded on
objective, rational, and humane grounds, and on nothing else. These various
religious prejudices, and many others, cannot pass the test. They rest, at most,
on the literal word of the book, and that is never enough. If the theme of this
Lecture poses any one challenge above others, it is this-the State must observe
the law of religious neutrality.
The vice of the literal word of the book is close to the fear of divine
punishment-a lively feature of the first kind of State or polity which I
described. This in its turn is close to what Plutarch in the first century A.D.
called superstition. Plutarch was born about A.D. 50 and came from Chaeronea
in Central Greece, where Philip of Macedon had defeated the Greek city-states in
338 B.C. The collection of his writings known to us as the Moralia is a series of
essays and dialogues on all sorts of subjects. In his essay on superstition,
Plutarch held that atheism and superstition were at two extremes, and the mean
between the two was piety, or, as we might describe it, decent religion. Here is
the flavour of his views of superstition:
Polycrates was a dreaded tyrant on Samos, as Periander was at
Corinth; yet nobody continued in fear of them who migrated to a free

13. McAdoo, supra note 8, at 116 (footnote omitted) (quoting HOOKER, supra note 11, bk
III, at 147).
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and democratic city. But if a man fears the rule of the gods as a grim,
inexorable tyranny, whither shall he migrate, whither shall he flee?
What land, what sea can he find that has no gods? In what corner of the
world, poor wretch, can you sink and hide yourself, confident that you
have escaped god? The law permits slaves who despair of winning their
freedom to apply to be sold and pass to a kinder master; but superstition
offers no change of gods, there is no way of finding a god who will not
be feared by the man who fears the gods of his ancestors and his family,
who shudders at the powers of salvation and beneficence, who goes in
fear and trembling at the thought of those from whom we ask wealth,
prosperity, peace, concord, and the success of our noblest words and
actions ....
... The slave has his altar of refuge, the robber his sanctuary in
many a temple, escapers from battle feel safe if they can touch a statue:
but the superstitious man goes in fear and terror of these very aids in
which men place their hopes when they fear the worst. 14
Plutarch's superstition is like the tyranny of the book. The superstitious man is a
slave-a slave with no escape. If God required us to be slaves, we ought to
disobey him; just as if he commanded us to slaughter the innocent or people who
happen not to believe in him, so also we ought to disobey him.
At the end let me make clear what I am not saying. I do not seek to deny
religious truth. I do not seek to deny religion a place in the life of civic society.
I have no patience with the shrill intemperate aggression of some of our more
vocal atheists. At home in England along with many others-people of religious
faith and of none-I greatly value the liturgy of the established church, at least in
the form of the Book of Common Prayer of 1662. I do not seek to deny the
status and propriety of ecclesiastical law-about which I indicated I would say a
little more. The Church of England's liturgy, and indeed its doctrine, are
prescribed by law-the Worship and Doctrine Measure of 1974. I have no
difficulty with any of this. However, in contrast to the position as it would have
been in the first kind of polity, which I have described, nothing in our law seeks
to compel or enforce religious belief in those who do not possess it. There is no
breach of the rule of the agnostic State. Indeed, the evolution of the first kind of
polity into the second may be signalled by what I would suggest can be seen as a
change in the nature-leave aside the content-of ecclesiastical law. Once it
was general compulsory law. As Thomas Glyn Watkin has written, referring to
the origins of the Church of England, "To be a subject of the King of England

14. For an alternate translation of Plutarch's words, see II Plutarch, Superstition, in Moralia
455, 463-65 (T.E. Page et al. eds., Frank Cole Babbitt trans., Harvard Univ. Press 3rd prtg. 1962)
(c. 90 C.E.).
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entailed acceptance of the reformed faith as part and parcel of loyalty to the
sovereign." 15
Cuius regio, eius religio.16 But now, and by contrast, our ecclesiastical law
regulates the Church's forms of worship and doctrine only for those who enter
into its fold. Anyone is free to remain outside. You can trace the development
of this position through the history of religious tolerance and intolerance. If the
rule was once Cuius regio, eius religio, it was changed in England not least by
the Toleration Act of 1689, the first year of the reign of William and Mary. The
Act granted freedom of worship to dissenters on certain prescribed conditions;
Roman Catholics and Unitarians, however, were not given the benefit of the
statute. Their religious liberty free of all constraints had to await the nineteenth
century.
I have urged the rules of the agnostic State, of religious neutrality, and of
religious freedom. They have to be obeyed by a State which respects the
freedom and reason of humankind, as a democracy under the rule of law will do.
I think these three rules are a condition of civilised democratic government. But
they can live alongside the church, even an established church, so long as church
and State both keep their swords in their scabbards.
Let St. Matthew have the last word, in the language of the King James Bible:
And they sent out unto him their disciples with the Herodians,
saying, Master, we know that thou art true, and teachest the way of God
in truth, neither carest thou for any man: for thou regardest not the
person of men.
Tell us therefore, What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute
unto Caesar, or not?
But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me,
ye hypocrites?
Show me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny.
And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription?
They say unto him, Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, Render
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the
things that are God's.

15. Thomas Glyn Watkin, Church and State in a Changing World, in ENGLISH CANON LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BISHOP ERIC KE1P 82, 86 (Norman Doe et al. eds., Univ. of Wales Press

1998).
16. "Whose realm, his religion."
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When they had heard these words, they marveled, and left him, and
went their way.17

17. St. Matthew 22:16-22 (King James).
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